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ABSTRACT
The current study investigated the subjective states of recollection and familiarity
in source memory. Participants studied low and high frequency words, presented in one
of two sources, and were then asked to make source decisions and subjective judgments
of recollection and familiarity at test. Half of participants were asked to identify the
source of an item before the subjective awareness judgment (SM-first group), while the
other half of participants made a source decision to an item after judging it as recollected
or familiar (RF-first group). The test order manipulation affected participants’ patterns of
responding. Participants in the RF-first group tended to give a recollect response to old
items more often. Participants in the SM-first group demonstrated better source memory.
Source memory was better for recollect judgments than familiar judgments; however,
source memory was above chance for familiar judgments. The low frequency word
advantage was found for recognition, source memory, and in judgments of subjective
awareness. A review of the related literature and current theories concerning human
memory attempts to account for the current results.

v

INTRODUCTION
Tulving (1983) introduced the classification of memory as being either episodic
or semantic, referring to whether details of an event are consciously recollected or not at
the time of retrieval, and further made the distinction between autonoetic and noetic
consciousness to reflect different states of conscious awareness that account for one’s
personal past and relates to these two types of memory classes (Tulving, 1985).
Autonoetic consciousness is thought to correspond to episodic memory, where details of
a personal memory can be consciously retrieved, such as remembering the last movie one
saw. Noetic consciousness is thought to correspond to semantic memory, or general
knowledge about the world that is not associated with specific details of encountering an
event’s initial occurrence, such as having knowledge of one’s own name. Delineating
these two memory systems and their conscious correlates has given rise to a body of
research investigating factors that may differentially affect one type of memory from
another (e. g., Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Java, 1990; Donaldson, 1996; Yonelinas,
2002).
The remember/know procedure was developed by Tulving (1985) intended to
separate remembering due to recollection of episodic details and remembering due to
feelings of familiarity. This procedure queries participants’ subjective state of awareness
during a memory test. Typically, on a recognition memory test, participants are shown a
list of items that have been previously studied along with new items that serve as
distracters or foils. Participants must not only determine whether an item is old or new,
but also must decide whether specific details of the item’s occurrence that were encoded
at the time of study are accessible or not for an item called old at retrieval. Participants
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are told to assign a remember designation to an item if specific details from the time of
study are present. If an item called old lacks any specific episodic details of its initial
occurrence, participants are told to make a know designation to refer to the general
feeling of familiarity present for that item.
This subjective measure of awareness has yielded mixed results when used in past
investigations of recognition memory. The frequency of remember and know responses to
recognized items has been shown to vary across a range of manipulations applied at the
time of encoding and retrieval. Deeper levels of processing (e.g., generating a word from
an anagram) at encoding has been shown to produce more remember responses at test
compared to remember responses given to items that were encoded under shallow
conditions (e.g., generating an unrelated rhyming word) while often leaving know
responses equal and unchanged (Gardiner, 1988; Rajaram, 1993; Bodner & Lindsay,
2003). Words have also been shown to receive more remember responses at retrieval
compared to nonwords, however nonwords showed higher rates of know responses
(Gardiner & Java, 1990). This pattern followed with items encoded as either a picture or
word, with pictures receiving more remember responses while words received more know
responses (Rajaram, 1993). Divided attention at study has also been shown to
differentially affect patterns of remember and know responding, with divided attention
conditions yielding fewer remember responses as difficulty on the divided attention task
increases, while leaving know responses unchanged (Gardiner & Parkin, 1990).
The remember/know procedure has also had to account for the word frequency
effect (Glanzer & Adams, 1985; 1990; Glanzer, Hilford, & Kim, 2004). The word
frequency effect is the finding that words of low frequency are consistently more
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accurately recognized, in terms of greater hits and fewer false alarms to items at test, than
high frequency words. An advantage for low frequency words has been found
consistently in recognition memory and in recognition accompanied with a remember
response (Gardiner & Java, 1990; Strack & Förster, 1995; Gardiner, Richardson-Klavenh,
Ramponi, 1997; Guttentag & Carroll, 1997; Reder et al., 2000; Diana & Reder, 2006).
Interestingly, correctly recognized words of low frequency have been shown to elicit
equal rates of know responses compared to high frequency words and, in some cases,
high frequency words have been shown to elicit even greater rates of know responses
compared to low frequency words (e. g., Strack & Förster, 1995; Guttentag & Carroll,
1997; Diana & Reder, 2006). This consistent word frequency effect found in recognition
memory may be able to account for some of the disparate findings in the way questions
regarding one aspect of a remembered event or another are asked at the time of test.
Specifically, how this effect may interact with the patterns of responding shown in
remember/know judgments.
Thus, prior research suggests that certain manipulations can give rise to different
patterns in remember/know responding, and that this subjective measure of awareness can
vary in many ways. The remember/know procedure may not necessarily tap the processes
present at retrieval assumed to contributed to conscious recollection of a remembered
event or remembering based on general feeling of familiarity (cf. Rotello, Macmillan,
Reeder, & Wong, 2005). Nevertheless, this procedure is useful in that responses fluctuate
and interact with different manipulations that also affect overall recognition memory, and
this subjective measure is useful in contributing to theories concerning the nature of
human memory (see Yonelinas, 2002 for a review).
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The source monitoring theory (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) has been
used as a paradigm to measure details retrieved from an item or event’s original
occurrence. In a typical source monitoring paradigm, participants study items from two or
more sources (e.g., seeing an item vs. hearing an item) and, at test, are asked to decide
whether an item is old or new as well as distinguish from what source the item was
originally presented (e.g., seen vs. heard). Memories for the source of an item may
consist of spatiotemporal details (e.g., size or location), perceptual details (e.g., font or
color), and different cognitive operations (e.g., imagine or rate), to name just a few. Some
have argued that accurate source discrimination is accompanied by the conscious
recollection of the details of an item’s original occurrence, as might be the case for
remember responses, and that accurate source recognition may not be able to occur if a
test item lacks any associative details at retrieval, as might be the case for know responses
(Donaldson, MacKenzie, & Underhill, 1996; Perfect, Mayes, Downes, & Van Eijk, 1996;
Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999; Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006). It is also important to note that
a low frequency word advantage has also been found in source memory (Guttentag &
Carroll, 1997; Glanzer et al., 2004; Diana & Reder, 2006).
Indeed, remember responses have been shown to reflect similar patterns of
recognition when tested separately from source memory, either as a between-subjects
manipulation or in separate experiments (Donaldson et al., 1996; Mather, Henkel, &
Johnson, 1997; Diana & Reder, 2006), and this pattern has been shown consistently even
when the remember/know and source decisions are made for each recognized item.
Interestingly, a consistent pattern is not found in know responses when investigated along
with source memory, and the prior research suggests that factors operating at retrieval
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may clarify the relationship between source memory and recognition associated with a
remember/know responses.
A list of studies using the remember/know procedure and the source monitoring
paradigm in combination at test is shown in Table 1. For the given studies, the findings
are variable, and the methodologies regarding testing to measure source memory and
subjective states of awareness are not consistent, but these studies provide insight into the
patterns of responding given testing conditions present at retrieval. Some of the
investigations show source memory at chance levels for know responses (Perfect et al.,
1996; Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999; Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006), suggesting no contextual
details being retrieved for those items. Other studies have shown source memory being
above chance levels for this subjective measure of familiarity (Conway & Dewhurst,
1995; Hicks, Marsh, & Ritschel, 2002; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Starns & Hicks, 2005;
Meiser & Sattler, 2007), suggesting that some contextual details may be present for those
items at retrieval, but maybe not enough to decide that those items can be given a
response reflecting the retrieval of episodic details. Although the studies listed in Table 1
vary in the types of sources used (e.g., perceptual or semantic), in the factors present at
encoding (e.g., long or short encoding time), and in factors during retention (e.g., 1 hour
or 1 week retention interval), the important point of these studies for present purposes is
to focus on the factors at retrieval. More specifically, how are the remember/know and
source questions asked?
Of the studies presented in Table 1, the investigations that show source memory at
chance given a know response, the remember/know questions was always asked before
the source question. For the studies that show source memory above chance for items
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Table 1
Review of Studies of Source Memory and Remember-Know Judgments.
Study

Test Order

Source Memory for Ks

Conway & Dewhurst (1995)
Exp. 2

O/N – R/K (test 1)
SM – R/K (test 2)

Perfect et al. (1996)
Exp. 1-5

R/K/N (test 1)
SM (test 2)

Dewhurst & Hitch (1999)
Exp. 2

R/K – SM
(SM only if confident)

at chance

Hicks et al. (2002)
Exp. 1 & 2

SM – R/K

above chance

Meiser & Bröder (2002)
Exp. 2

O/N – R/K – SM

above chance

Starns & Hicks (2005)
Exp. 1 & 2

R/K – SM

above chance

Dudukovic & Knowlton (2006)
Exp. 1

O/N – R/K – SM1 – SM2

at chance

Meiser & Sattler (2007)
Exp. 1-3

O/N – R/K – SM

above chance

above chance

at chance
(except for Exp. 3)

given a know response, all but two asked the remember/know judgment after the source
question. It could stand to reason that asking one type of question before the other may
affect judgments concerning the types of details being retrieved. Several studies have
manipulated the order of questions or type of questions asked at test, and have shown to
6

affect patterns of responding in investigations of the remember/know procedure (Hicks &
Marsh, 1999; Eldridge, Sarfatti, & Knowlton, 2002) and in source monitoring (Dodson &
Johnson, 1993; Marsh & Hicks, 1998). However no direct manipulation of test order has
been used when investigating remember/know responses and source memory in the same
study. Details of subjective awareness that are claimed to be present at retrieval may
reflect details of an item’s source or other details not inherently associated with the item’s
perceptual features. This may be why source memory is not perfectly correlated with this
subjective measure of recollection and why feelings of familiarity may contain enough
details in memory, whether conscious or not, to correctly identify the source of a
recognized item (i.e., know responses being above chance for accurate source memory).
These details may be affected by asking what to consider first; memory for the source of
an item, or if any episodic details are present or not for an item judged to be old.
Although a manipulation of test order has not been used in a combined source
memory and remember/know design, past studies from both lines of research have shown
how questions are asked at test can affect patterns of responses. Hicks and Marsh (1999),
and Eldridge et al. (2002), investigated recollection and familiarity and gave participants
either two questions at test, an old/new question followed by a remember/know judgment
for items judged old, or one question at test, a remember/know/new judgment.
Participants who were given the one question at test tended to produce higher hits and
false alarms for items judged remembered and higher false alarms for items called know
(no differences in know hits), suggesting participants who were given the one question at
test responded more liberally than participants who were given two questions. Dodson
and Johnson (1993) manipulated the testing situation in a source memory test by asking
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participants for either a binary source judgment or a four alternative forced-choice source
judgment. Participants who received the four alternative judgment were less likely to
make incorrect source judgments than participants who were given the binary judgment.
Marsh and Hicks (1998) also manipulated the type of questions asked in a source
memory test by asking participants if they remembered specific details of the item for the
source decision (i.e., Did you hear this item at study? or Did you see this item at study?).
Participants who were queried about the specific details of an item at test were better able
to recognize the source of the item if it came from that particular source as oppose to the
other source. These results suggest that having to judge features of an item at test (i.e.,
old/new or which did you see?) as oppose to the subjective details of an item or an openended source decision (i.e., remember/know/new or seen/heard?) may cause participants
to focus more on those details of an item that would lead to more accurate remembering,
as opposed to more spurious recognition shown in increases in false alarms for remember
and know judgments and incorrect source memory.
The present experiment investigates source memory and the subjective state of
awareness of an item’s occurrence at study by manipulating the order in which the
questions are asked at test and observing the patterns of responses given to low frequency
and high frequency words. Participants will study low and high frequency words
presented either on the left or right side of a computer monitor in a corresponding
background color. For half of participants, a source memory question will be asked
before a question concerning their subjective awareness of recollection or familiarity for
each item at test. For the other half of participants, these questions will be reversed, with
the subjective awareness question preceding the source question. In order to avoid any
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ambiguity in the interpretation of the recollection and familiarity distinction, the measure
of subjective awareness asks participants to give a recollect response to items they feel
give rise to the retrieval of contextual or episodic details (i.e., a remember response) and
to give a familiar response to items they feel lack any episodic details from study (i.e., a
know response). The questions of interest for the current investigation are: does
manipulating the order of the type of question at test affect participants’ recognition
accuracy, source accuracy, and judgments of subjective awareness, and is any difference
reflected in terms of items’ normative word frequency? The results will be discussed as
they relate to past findings in the literature and in terms of current theories of human
memory.
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METHOD
Participants
One hundred fifty-two Louisiana State University undergraduate students
participated for an introductory course requirement or in exchange for extra credit
towards a psychology course. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to the RFfirst test order group and the other half were assigned to the SM-first test order group.
Each participant was tested individually in sessions that lasted approximately 30 minutes.
Design and Materials
One hundred twenty words of high and low frequency were selected as stimuli
from the Kučera and Francis (1967) compendium. Low frequency words had an average
rate of occurrence of 6 per million. High frequency words had an average rate of
occurrence of 63 per million. Word frequency was manipulated within-subjects.
Participants were presented with 30 high and 30 low frequency words at study. Words
were presented in all uppercase letters, either on the left side of the computer monitor in a
red background or on the right side of the computer monitor in a green background. A set
of arithmetic problems served as a four minute filler task between study and test. At test,
all studied words were presented along with 60 lure words, 30 of high and 30 of low
frequency. The order of test instructions was manipulated between-subjects and described
in more detail in the procedure. All words were counterbalanced for the study and test
portions of the experiment.
Procedure
At the beginning of the experimental session, participants were instructed to
remember words for a later memory test. Participants then proceeded to the study phase
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of the experiment. Words were presented for 3 seconds each with an interstimulus
interval of 150 ms. At completion of study, participants were given the filler task.
Participants were told that their problem solving abilities were to be assessed, and were
given a set of twelve multiplication problems to be solved for four minutes. After the
filler task, participants were given instructions for the test.
Participants were given recollect-familiar instructions as well as instructions to
identify an item’s source at test. Recollect-familiar instructions were given as follows:
For this part of the experiment, if you believe that a word was presented
earlier, you will be asked to choose the reason that you believe a test word
was presented. There are many possibilities for this decision. One option
is that you believe the word was presented because it feels very familiar to
you. This would be similar to the feeling that people have sometimes
when they pass someone on the street and know that we've met the person
before, but cannot think of when or where. There are other possibilities
that all include cases in which you feel like you can mentally travel back
in time to the specific moment you encountered the word. This feeling is
called recollection. For example, you might recognize a test word because
you remember forming an image of the word. Or perhaps you recall
something you thought of when you encountered the word. Or perhaps
you recall one or two words that were presented just before or after the test
word. Or that you recall specifically which side of the screen the item was
shown on. Or even that you recall something that happened in or near the
room when the word was presented (such as a noise outside the door). But
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you should respond with one of these types of options ONLY if the test
word brings back to mind a vivid recollection of one of these particular
details. To summarize, you'll be making decisions about whether you
remember that a test word was presented to you earlier or not presented at
all. If you believe that the test word was presented earlier, you'll be asked
to decide whether this word simply feels familiar to you or whether you
recollect specific details. If it simply feels familiar, then press the 'FAM'
key on the keyboard. If you can recollect any type of specific detail, then
press the 'REC' key.
Participants were instructed to press one of two keys on the keyboard to make the
recollect-familiar judgment. Instructions to identify an item’s source prompted
participants to press one of two keys on the keyboard to judge whether an item appeared
on the left side of the computer monitor in a red background or on the right side of the
computer monitor in a green background. For all participants, the first set of options at
test was accompanied with the option to call an item “new.” Participants were
admonished from guessing, and told to make a “new” response if they felt they had to
guess. All of the test instructions were shown on the computer monitor and verbally
reiterated by the experimenter. All 120 words were presented one at a time in the center
of the screen with the source options and recollect-familiar options appearing below the
item. Half of the participants were prompted to make a recollect-familiar-new judgment
first, then a source judgment for items labeled recollect or familiar (RF-first group). The
other half of the participants were prompted to make a left/red-right/green-new source
judgment first, then a recollect-familiar judgment for items given one of the two source
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claims (SM-first group). Participants were debriefed as to their involvement upon
completion of the test phase.
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RESULTS
Recognition Memory
Overall recognition memory performance is shown in Table 2. Recognition
memory was measured using a corrected recognition measure (hits – false alarms). A 2
(test order: SM-first vs. RF-first) × 2 (word frequency: low vs. high) mixed factorial
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with test order as the between-subjects
factor and word frequency as the within-subjects factor. The analysis revealed a main
effect of word frequency, F (1, 150) = 152.30, MSE = 1.67, p < .01, η 2p = .50. Low
frequency words (M = .57) were better recognized than high frequency words (M = .42),
replicating the word frequency mirror effect. There was no main effect of test order, F (1,
150) = .349, MSE = .016, p > .05, η 2p = .02. Participants in the SM-first group (M = .49)
showed equal recognition performance as those in the RF-first group (M = .50). No
interactions were found, F (1, 150) = .133, MSE = .001, p > .05, η 2p = .001.
Recollect-Familiar Judgments
Recognition memory performance for the test order groups and for word
frequency given either a recollect or familiar response is shown in Table 2. A 2 (test
order: SM-first vs. RF-first) × 2 (word frequency: low vs. high) mixed factorial ANOVA
was conducted on the mean hit rates, false alarm rates, and corrected recognition rates of
recollect and familiar responses with test order as the between-subjects factor and word
frequency as the within-subjects factor. The rate of recollect responses for corrected
recognition was significantly higher for low frequency words (M = .38) than high
frequency words (M = .27), F (1, 150) = 100.91, MSE = .825, p < .01, η 2p = .402. The rate
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of recollect responses for corrected recognition for the RF-first group (M = .36) was
significantly higher compared to the SM-first group (M = .29), F (1, 150) = 4.70, MSE =
Table 2
Hit Rates, False Alarm Rates, and Corrected Recognition Rates as a Function of Test Order,
Word Frequency, and Response Type.

Test

Response

Order

Type

Word Frequency
Low

Hits
SM-first

RF-first

High

FAs

Corrected

Hits

FAs

Corrected

Overall

.67 (.02)

.11 (.01)

.56 (.02)

.62 (.02)

.21 (.02) .42 (.02)

Recollect

.38 (.02)

.03 (.01)

.35 (.02)

.30 (.02)

.07 (.01) .24 (.02)

Familiar

.29 (.02)

.08 (.01)

.21 (.02)

.32 (.02)

.14 (.01) .18 (.02)

Overall

.70 (.02)

.12 (.01)

.58 (.02)

.65 (.02)

.23 (.02) .42 (.02)

Recollect

.44 (.03)

.04 (.01)

.40 (.03)

.37 (.02)

.06 (.01) .31 (.02)

Familiar

.25 (.02)

.08 (.01)

.17 (.02)

.28 (.02)

.17 (.01) .11 (.02)

Note. Standard error of mean in parentheses.

.318, p < .05, η 2p = .03. The same pattern followed for the hit rates of recollect responses.
Low frequency words had a greater hit rate (M = .41) than high frequency words (M =
.34), F (1, 150) = 56.46, MSE = .44, p < .01, η 2p = .273, and the RF-first group gave
recollect responses to old items more often (M = .40) than the SM-first group (M = .34),
although this difference was marginal, F (1, 150) = 3.80, MSE = .305, p = .053, η 2p =
.025. Recollect responses to lures were significantly higher for high frequency words (M
= .06) compared to low frequency words (M = .03), F (1, 150) = 35.40, MSE = .06, p <
15

.01, η 2p = .191. There was also a marginal interaction of test order by word frequency
with high frequency lures being given recollect responses slightly more often in the SMfirst group (M = .07) than high frequency lures in the RF-first group (M = .06), and low
frequency lures in the SM-first group (M = .03) and RF-first group (M = .04), F (1, 150)
= 3.12, MSE = .005, p = .079, η 2p = .02. There were no other differences found in
recollect responses, all F’s (1, 150) < .548, p’s > .05.
For items given a familiar response, there was a main effect of word frequency
for corrected recognition rates. Low frequency words (M = .19) were given more familiar
responses than high frequency words (M = .14), F (1, 150) = 17.51, MSE = .148, p < .01,
η 2p = .105. There was also a main effect of test order with participants in the SM-first
group giving more familiar responses (M = .19) than those in the RF-first group (M =
.14), F (1, 150) = 4.99, MSE = .192, p < .05, η 2p = .032. For overall hit rates, the pattern
slightly changed. A main effect was again found for word frequency, but was in the other
direction for hit rates. High frequency old items were given more familiar responses (M =
.30) than low frequency old items (M = .27), F (1, 150) = 7.30, MSE = .056, p < .01, η 2p =
.046. For familiar responses given to lures, a main effect of word frequency and a test
order by word frequency interaction was found. Familiar responses given to high
frequency new items was greater (M = .16) than those given to low frequency new items
(M = .08), F (1, 150) = 95.72, MSE = .386, p < .01, η 2p = .39, and this occurred more for
participants in the RF-first group (M = .17) than in the SM-first group (M = .14), while
low frequency new items were given familiar responses equally often for the RF-first
group (M = .08) and SM-first group (M = .08), F (1, 150) = 4.57, MSE = .018, p < .05,
16

η 2p = .03. No other differences were found for familiar responses, all F’s (1, 150) < 1.78,
p’s > .05.
Source Memory
Source memory was measured using an average conditional source identification
measure (ACSIM; Murnane & Bayen, 1996), calculated as the proportion of correct
source identifications among all old items that were called old. Source memory is shown
in Table 3. ACSIM scores were submitted to a 2 (test order: SM-first vs. RF-first) × 2
(word frequency: low vs. high) mixed factorial ANOVA with test order as the betweensubjects factor and word frequency as the within-subjects factor. A main effect of word
frequency was found, F (1, 150) = 61.04, MSE = .62, p < .01, η 2p = .289. Source memory
for low frequency words (M = .72) was better than source memory for high frequency
words (M = .63). Participants in the SM-first group showed similar source memory (M =
.69) as those in the RF-first group (M = .66), F (1, 150) = 1.84, MSE = .044, p > .05, η 2p =
.012, and no interaction was found, F (1, 150) = 1.51, MSE = .015, p > .05, η 2p = .01.
Source memory was also examined as accurate source identifications given either
a recollect or familiar response. In other words, these measures were analogous to
ACSIMs, but were contingent on whether participants gave a recollect or familiar
response. These data are also shown in Table 3. The data were submitted to a 2 (test
order: SM-first vs. RF-first) × 2 (word frequency: low vs. high) × 2 (response type:
recollect vs. familiar) mixed factorial ANOVA with test order as the between-subjects
factor and word frequency and response type as the within-subjects factors. Main effects
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Table 3
Average Conditional Source Identification Measures (ACSIMs) as a Function of Test Order,
Word Frequency, and Response Type (with measure conditionalized on type of response).

Test

Response

Order

Type

Low

High

SM-first

Overall

.74 (.01)

.63 (.01)

Recollect

.81 (.02)

.74 (.02)

Familiar

.65 (.02)

.58 (.02)

Overall

.70 (.02)

.62 (.02)

Recollect

.76 (.02)

.65 (.02)

Familiar

.60 (.03)

.59 (.03)

RF-first

Word Frequency

Note. Standard error of mean in parentheses.

were found for test order, F (1, 143) = 7.10, MSE = .379, p < .01, η 2p = .047, word
frequency, F (1, 143) = 20.83, MSE = .671, p < .01, η 2p = .127, and response type, F (1,
143) = 53.00, MSE = 2.64, p < .01, η 2p = .27. Participants in the SM-first group (M = .70)
showed better source identification than the RF-first group (M = .64). Low frequency
words (M = .70) were more correctly identified than high frequency words (M = .64).
Source identifications associated with recollect responses (M = .74) was better than those
associated with familiar responses (M = .60). Also of note is that the high frequency
ACSIM given a familiar response was above chance (M = .58) and this was confirmed by
comparing the mean value to the chance value of .50 through a one sample t-test, t (148)
= 4.48, p < .01. Not surprisingly, low frequency words given a familiar response (M =
18

.63) were also significantly above chance, t (147) = 7.24, p < .01. There was a nonsignificant word frequency by response type interaction with more recollect responses
given to low frequency words (M = .78) than recollect responses given to high frequency
words (M = .69), than familiar responses given to low frequency (M = .63) and high
frequency words (M = .58), F (1, 143) = 2.79, MSE = .094, p = .097, η 2p = .019. No other
main effects or interactions were found, all F’s (1, 143) < 1.54, p’s > .05.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current results replicate previous collective findings from past investigations
of subjective awareness, source memory, and the word frequency effect. Overall,
recognition that was accompanied with a recollect response was more accurate than
recognition accompanied with a familiar response (Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Java,
1990). In addition, recollection-based recognition was better for those in the RF-first
group as compared to the SM-first group. This pattern is evident in the corrected
recognition rates in Table 2. The reverse pattern was found in regards to source accuracy
(Table 3) with the SM-first group showing better source memory following recollect
responses as compared to the RF-first group (Perfect et al., 1996; Dewhurst & Hitch,
1999; Dudukovic & Knowlton, 2006; Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Hicks et al., 2002;
Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Starns & Hicks, 2005; Meiser & Sattler, 2007). The SM-first
group showed higher rates of familiar responses in both the corrected recognition rates as
well as in the source accuracy data; however, for source accuracy, this trend was only
found for low frequency words, whereas high frequency words produced equal levels of
source recognition for familiar responses. Source memory associated with familiar
responses was shown to be above chance, suggesting that source memory is present at
retrieval for items that were judged previously to have no associated episodic details
(Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Hicks et al., 2002; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Starns & Hicks,
2005; Meiser & Sattler, 2007).
The findings also replicate the word frequency effect with low frequency words
being recognized overall more accurately than high frequency words (Glanzer & Adams,
1985; 1990). Moreover, for hit rates and corrected recognition rates (see Table 2), low
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frequency words received more recollect responses than high frequency words. This
pattern tended to occur more for participants in the RF-first group, but this was only
evident in the hit rates for that group. High frequency words tended to produce more
familiar responses, but this was only found in the hit rates and false alarm rates. The
corrected recognition rates for familiar responses were higher for low frequency words
than high frequency words. The hit rate and corrected recognition rates overall were
greater for familiar responses in the SM-first group than in the RF-first group. High
frequency words produced more false alarms overall than low frequency words, and there
were more false alarms for familiar responses than for recollect responses (see
Donaldson, 1996; Reder et al., 2000; Diana & Reder, 2006). The RF-first group showed
higher rates of familiar false alarms than the SM-first group.
There was also a word frequency effect for source accuracy data (see Table 3).
Overall, low frequency words produced better source accuracy than high frequency
words, replicating the word frequency mirror effect (Glanzer et al., 2004; Diana & Reder,
2006). This was found in both the recollect responses and familiar responses. Again, the
SM-first group showed better source accuracy in recollect and familiar responses for low
and high frequency words than the RF-first group. The important points are the fact that
familiar responses to high frequency words showed above chance source memory and
that false alarms were found for recollect responses for both low and high frequency
words, with high frequency words showing greater false alarm rates for recollect
responses (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Hicks et al., 2002; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Starns
& Hicks, 2005; Meiser & Sattler, 2007).
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The patterns found in the current data can be explained in terms of current
theories of recognition memory. There are currently two predominant classes of models
that have been used to accommodate past findings: single process theories and dual
process theories. The single process theories posit that remembering is due to a single
process of familiarity in memory. This process can be modeled in terms of signal
detection theory (Macmaillan & Creelman, 2005), where two Gaussian distributions, one
for new items and one for old items, are situated along an axis representing strength of
memory. A decision criterion is then placed along the axis that accounts for the decision
to call items old or new. Figure 1 depicts two such pairs of distributions, one pair for
high frequency words and one pair for low frequency words.
O/N

HF New
LF New

R/F

HF Old
LF Old

Figure 1. Signal detection model for recognition and recollect/familiar distinction. The
distributions represent the memorial evidence for old and new words of low and high
frequency. The vertical lines represent response criteria for old/new and recollect/familiar
decisions.
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Single process models of recollect/familiar responses involve two criteria that are
placed along the decision axis (Donaldson, 1996; Hirshman & Master, 1997; Hirshman &
Henzler, 1998). Items that fall to the right of the old-new decision criterion, but to the
left of the recollect/familiar criterion, will be labeled familiar. If enough episodic detail
of the item is present and the amount of evidence falls to the right of the recollect/familiar
criterion, the result is the self-report of an item’s consciously recollected experience (i.e.,
a recollect response). This would explain the higher hit rates and lower false alarm rates
that are associated with recollection responses over familiar responses in the current data.
This model would also explain why false alarms can occur for items given a recollect
response, where no such episodic details should be retrieved from memory for a new
item, and potentially why items given a familiar response can be associated with accurate
source memory. The single process interpretation has been shown to account for results
investigating recollect/familiar responses, source memory, and the word frequency effect
(Donaldson, 1996; Donaldson et al., 1996; Hirshman & Master, 1997; Hirshman &
Henzler, 1998; Wixted & Stretch, 2004; Dobbins & Kroll, 2005; Slotnick & Dodson,
2005).
Signal detection models of source memory account for source recognition by
having two or more distributions, depending on the number of sources used, that
represent the memory present for each source, after an item has been recognized as old
(Slotnick & Dodson, 2005). These distributions are situated along a decision axis with
criteria placed for each respective source decision. Given the amount of difference or
similarity between sources, these distributions will move either closer together or farther
away from each other, thus increasing or decreasing the discriminability between the
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sources. Given that the sources for the current study are relatively similar in
memorability, these distributions should only change in terms of the strength associated
with an item at test. This strength in the current data can be explained in terms of an
item’s normative word frequency (Glanzer, Adams, Iverson, & Kim, 1993; Wixted &
Stretch, 2004).
Single process models can explain the word frequency effect in terms of two
different distributions for old items that are situated along the decision axis; a distribution
representing strong items (i.e., low frequency words) that is placed farther away from the
distribution representing new items, and a distribution representing weak items (i.e., high
frequency words) that is placed closer to the distribution of new items relative to the
strong distribution (Glanzer et al., 1993; Wixted & Stretch, 2004). A conceptual model is
presented in Figure 2. This can account for the advantage low frequency words have over
high frequency words in recognition accuracy, which is replicated in the current findings.
When applying the two criteria that are thought to account for recollect and familiar
responses, as discussed above, this would also explain the advantage that low frequency
words have over high frequency words in terms of greater hits and fewer false alarms for
recollect and familiar responses, as well as in the low frequency word advantage found in
the source accuracy data (Glanzer et al., 2004). The source memory evidence axis is
orthogonal to the recognition memory axis. By examining Figure 2, one can see how
source memory, on average, will be better for low frequency words, but also why source
memory following recollect responses will be even higher as compared to source
memory following familiar responses. Because recognition memory is generally
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correlated with source memory (Glanzer et al., 2004), low frequency words have an
advantage in both respects.

O/N

R/K

Source B

New
Source Evidence
λS

Source A

Recognition Evidence

LF:

HF: - - - - -

Figure 2. A model for recognition, source memory, and recollect/familiar distinctions.
The ovals represent the memorial evidence for new words of low and high frequency and
old words of low and high frequency from each source. The horizontal line represents
source criterion. The vertical lines represent response criteria for old/new and
recollect/familiar decisions.
Dual process theories hypothesize memory as two separate and independent
systems that account for memories associated with contextual or episodic details (i.e.,
recollection) and for memories that lack these details and represents general memory
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strength (i.e., familiarity). For dual process models, familiarity is thought to be a
continuous process that occurs automatically and is thought to reflect implicit memory,
semantic memory, or generic familiarity, while recollection is thought to be a controlled
process that occurs if an item or event gives rise to the recollection of episodic details,
and is thought to reflect explicit memory or episodic memory (Mandler, 1980; Jacoby,
1991; Yonelinas, 2002). Familiarity should contain no associated episodic details, while
recollection should reflect conscious awareness of an item or events’ experience from
encoding. Some models of dual process theory classify items in terms of their potential to
be consciously recollected such as heightened activation for that item that would lead to
recollection or some other experience that is entirely differentiated from familiarity
(Reder et al., 2000). Some models account for remembering as being due to an
assessment of familiarity of an item, or due to a controlled search process that would lead
to recollection (Mandler, 1980). Some have also accounted for familiarity being due to
processing fluency that occurs in an automatic fashion, while recollection is due to a
consciously controlled search process where contextual and episodic details are retrieved
from memory (Jacoby, 1991). It is also thought that familiarity is due to the quantitative
memorial aspects of an item, whereas recollection results from the all-or-none likelihood
for episodic or contextual details to be present at retrieval (Yonelinas, 1999; 2002). Some
models have proposed a signal detection interpretation for the familiarity process, where
the distributions for old and new items may overlap, while recollection functions
independently (Yonelinas, 1999; 2002).
Dual process models account for the word frequency effect in terms of prior, or
preexperimental, contexts associated with low and high frequency words and their
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respective activation maintained in memory (Joordens & Hockley, 2000; Reder et al.,
2000; Diana & Reder, 2006). High frequency words are assumed to be associated with
more prior contexts than low frequency words, thus accounting for higher rates of
familiar responses, lower rates of recollect responses, and higher rates of false alarms.
Low frequency words, being associated with fewer prior contexts, are better associated
with the experimental context (or source), generating an overall accuracy advantage in
recognition, in source memory, and the higher rates of recollect responses and lower rates
of familiar responses that are given to those items.
Evidence from neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience suggests that
different brain regions can account for recognition that is accompanied by recollection
and familiarity. Investigations from special populations that suffer amnesia due to some
kind of brain injury show that both recollection and familiarity can be impaired, however
recollection consistently appears to show greater deficits than familiarity (Knowlton &
Squire, 1995; Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara, & Knight, 1998; Rajaram, Hamilton,
& Bolton, 2002). This same pattern has been shown in patients with damage to the
hippocampus due to childhood hypoxia, and the deficits in recollection and familiarity
are affected by the extent of damage to that region (Yonelinas, Kroll, Quamme, Lazzara,
Sauvé, Widaman, & Knight, 2002). Evidence from neuroimaging studies also show the
hippocampus contributes to both recollection and familiarity; however, the hippocampus
may be a more important contributor to recollection while areas of the medial temporal
lobe surrounding the hippocampus appear to be a more important contributor to
familiarity (Knowlton, 1998; Eldridge, Knowlton, Furmanski, Bookheimer, & Engel,
2000). Findings from studies using event-related potentials (ERPs) have shown that the
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frontal and parietal regions of the brain also contribute to recollection and familiarity
(Rugg, Mark, Walla, Schloerscheidt, Birch, & Allan, 1998). The frontal areas have been
shown to become quickly activated in the presence of recollection and familiarity, as well
as in accurate source memory (Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, & Greene, 2004) and with
recognition of low frequency words (Rugg, Cox, Doyle, & Wells, 1995). Activation has
been shown to spread, however not as quickly, to the left lateral parietal region when
recognition is thought to be accompanied exclusively with feelings of recollection
(Curran, 2000). Interestingly, no studies have shown decrements in familiarity with
recollection fully intact (Rugg & Yonelinas, 2003).
Regardless of the models utilized to test any hypothesis concerning recollection
and familiarity, it is apparent in the data that this measure of subjective awareness may
not necessarily reflect one memory system or the other, but is nevertheless useful in
showing what is being retrieved from study when remembering is associated with
normative word frequency and the requirement for source attributions. Just as old/new
decisions are not process pure, it would appear that recollect/familiar decisions act much
in the same way (Wixted & Stretch, 2004; Gonsalves, Kahn, Curran, Norman, & Wagner,
2005; Wixted, 2007). It may be the recollect responses reflect items recognized with high
confidence while familiar responses reflect items recognized with relatively lower
confidence in typical laboratory tasks. From the current data, as well as the findings from
past investigations, it appears that recognition may occur due to contributions of both
recollection and familiarity.
Though not subscribing to one theory or the other, the data suggest that when
participants are asked for the RF distinction first, they tend be more inclined to give a
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recollect response to old items, while participants who were asked for the source decision
first tended to exhibit more accurate recognition in terms of source identification for both
items called recollect and for items called familiar. The data suggest that having the RF
decision come first may cause participants to respond more liberally, as shown in the
patterns of recollect responses and in the hits and false alarms in Table 2. Whereas
having the source decision come first may cause participants to be more conservative in
their responding, as evident in the increased source accuracy for that group in the data in
Table 3. Although post hoc, this sort of criterion shift is more consistent with signal
detection models of the recollect/familiar distinction that explicitly posit a decision
criterion to separate recollection from familiarity (e.g., Donaldson, 1996; Hicks & Marsh,
1999). There is no a priori reason to expect differences between these test conditions
owing to overall memory strength or to distribution placement as depicted in Figures 1
and 2. .
Obviously, the findings from the current study need to be validated with other
manipulations that may affect what exactly is retrieved at the time of test, as well as other
methods that may be better explained by a single or dual process model of memory.
Certainly other manipulations of testing should be conducted to further delineate the
cognitive processes at retrieval that may be affected by such manipulations. How might
responding be affected if two separate tests at retrieval are administered and participants
are asked for either recollect or familiar judgments first, and then given the same list of
items judged old to be assigned to the correct source, and vice versa? How might
responding change if participants are probed for a rationale for a given recollect decision
to see what basis they are using to report items have associated episodic details?
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Confidence ratings also be used with the current type of test manipulation to examine
both source memory and what would be recollection or familiarity, and from these,
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves can be generated and explained in terms
of single and dual process models of memory. The current investigation is a first step
toward understanding how questions asked at test can affect performance on a given
recognition experiment.

30

REFERENCES
Bodner, G. E., & Lindsay, D. S. (2003). Remembering and knowing in context. Journals
of Memory and Language, 48, 563-580.
Conway, M. A., & Dewhurst, S. A. (1995). Remembering, familiarity, and source
monitoring. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 48A, 125-140.
Curran, T. (2000). Brain potentials of recollection and familiarity. Memory & Cognition,
28, 923-938.
Dewhurst, S. A., & Hitch, G. J. (1999). Cognitive effort and recollective experience in
recognition memory. Memory, 7, 129-146.
Diana, R. A., & Reder, L. M. (2006). The low-frequency encoding disadvantage: Word
frequency affects processing demands. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32, 805-815.
Dobbins, I. G., & Kroll, N. E. A. (2005). Distinctiveness and the recognition mirror
effect: Evidence for an item-based criterion placement heuristic. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31, 1186-1198.
Dodson, C. S., & Johnson, M. K. (1993). Rate of false source attributions depends on
how questions are asked. American Journal of Psychology, 106, 541-557.
Donaldson, W. (1996). The role of decision processes in remembering and knowing.
Memory & Cognition, 24, 523-533.
Donaldson, W., MacKenzie, T. M., & Underhill, C. F. (1996). A comparison of
recollective memory and source monitoring. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3,
486-490.
Dudukovic, N. M., & Knowlton, B. J. (2006). Remember-Know judgments and retrieval
of contextual details. Acta Psychologica, 122, 160-173.
Eldridge, L. L., Knowlton, B. J., Fermanski, C. S., Bookheimer, S. Y., & Engel, S. A.
(2000). Remembering episodes: A selective role for the hippocampus during
retrieval. Nature Neuroscience, 3, 1149-1152.
Eldridge, L. L., Sarfatti, S., & Knowlton, B. J. (2002). The effect of testing procedure on
remember-know judgments. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9, 139-145.
Gardiner, J. M. (1988). Functional aspects of recollective experience. Memory &
Cognition, 16, 617-623.

31

Gardiner, J. M., & Java, R. I. (1990). Recollective experience in word and nonword
recognition. Memory & Cognition, 18, 23-30.
Gardiner, J. M., & Parkin, A. J. (1990). Attention and recollective experience in
recognition memory. Memory & Cognition, 18, 579-583.
Gardiner, J. M., Richardson-Klavehn, A., & Ramponi, C. (1997). On reporting
recollective experiences and ‘direct access to memory systems.’ Psychological
Science, 8, 391-394.
Glanzer, M., & Adams, J. K. (1985). The mirror effect in recognition memory. Memory
& Cognition, 13, 8-20.
Glanzer, M., & Adams, J. K. (1990). The mirror effect in recognition memory: Data and
theory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition,
16, 5-16.
Glanzer, M., Adams, J. K., Iverson, G. J., & Kim, K. (1993). The regularities of
recognition memory. Psychological Review, 100, 546-567.
Glanzer, M., Hilford, A., & Kim, K. (2004). Six regularities of source recognition.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30,
1176-1195.
Gonsalves, B. D., Kahn, I., Curran, T., Norman, K. A., & Wagner, A. D. (2005). Memory
strength and repetition suppression: Multimodal imaging of medial temporal
cortical contributions to recognition. Neuron, 47, 751-761.
Guttentag, R. E., & Carroll, D. (1997). Recollection-based recognition: Word frequency
effects. Journal of Memory and Language, 37, 502-516.
Hicks, J. L., & Marsh, R. L. (1999). Remember-know judgments can depend on how
memory is tested. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 6, 117-122.
Hicks, J. L., Marsh, R. L., & Ritschel, L. (2002). The role of recollection and partial
information in source monitoring. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 28, 503-508.
Hirshman, E., & Master, S. (1997). Modeling the conscious correlates of recognition
memory: Reflections on the remember-know paradigm. Memory & Cognition, 25,
345-351.
Hirshman, E., & Henzler, A. (1998). The role of decision processes in conscious
recollection. Psychological Science, 9, 61-65.

32

Jacoby, L. L. (1991). A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from
intentional uses of memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 30, 513-541.
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source monitoring.
Psychological Bulletin, 114, 3-28.
Joordens, S., & Hockley, W. E. (2000). Recollection and familiarity through the looking
glass: When old does not mirror new. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 1534-1555.
Knowlton, B. J., & Squire, L. R. (1995). Remembering and knowing: Two different
expressions of declarative memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21, 699-710.
Knowlton, B. J., (1998). The relationship between remembering and knowing: A
cognitive neuroscience perspective. Acta Psychologica, 98, 253-265.
Kučera, F., & Francis, W. (1967). Computational analysis of present-day American
English. Providence, RI: Brown University Press.
Macmillan, N. A., & Creelman, C. D. (2005). Detection theory: A user's guide (2nd ed.).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Mandler, G. (1980). Recognizing: The judgment of previous occurrence. Psychological
Review, 87, 252-271.
Marsh, R. L., & Hicks, J. L. (1998). Test formats change source-monitoring decision
processes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 24, 1137-1151.
Mather, M., Henkel, L. A., & Johnson, M. K. (1997). Evaluating characteristics of false
memories: Remember/know judgments and memory characteristics questionnaire
compared. Memory & Cognition, 25, 826-837.
Meiser, T., & Bröder, A. (2002). Memory for multidimensional source information.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 28,
116-137.
Meiser, T., & Sattler, C. (2007). Boundaries of the relation between conscious
recollection and source memory for perceptual details. Consciousness and
Cognition, 16, 189-210.
Mitchell, K. J., Johnson, M. K., Raye, C. L. & Greene, E. J. (2004). Prefrontal cortex
activity associated with source monitoring in a working memory task. Journal of
Cognitive Neuroscience, 16, 921-934.

33

Murnane, K., & Bayen, U. J. (1996). An evaluation of empirical measures of source
identification. Memory & Cognition, 24, 417-428.
Perfect, T. J., Mayes, A. R., Downes, J. J., & Van Eijk, R. (1996). Does context
discriminate recollection from familiarity in recognition memory? The Quarterly
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 49A, 797-813.
Rajaram, S. (1993). Remembering and knowing: Two means of access to the personal
past. Memory & Cognition, 21, 89-102.
Rajaram, S., Hamilton, M., & Bolton, A. (2002). Distinguishing states of awareness from
confidence during retrieval: Evidence from amnesia. Cognitive, Affective, &
Behavioral Neuroscience, 2, 227-235.
Reder, L. M., Nhouyvanisvong, A., Schunn, C. D., Ayers, M. S., Angstadt, P., & Hiraki,
K. (2000). A mechanistic account of the mirror effect for word frequency: A
computational model of remember-know judgments in a continuous recognition
paradigm. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 26, 294-320
Rotello, C. M., Macmillan, N. A., Reeder, J. A., & Wong, M. (2005). The remember
response: Subject to bias, graded, and not a process-pure indicator of
recollection. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12, 865-873.
Rugg, M. D., Cox, C. J. C., Doyle, M. C., & Wells, T. (1995). Event-related potentials
and the recollection of low and high frequency words. Neuropsychologia, 33,
471-484.
Rugg, M. D., Mark, R. E., Walla, P., Schloerscheidt, A. M., Birch, C. S., & Allan, K.
(1998). Dissociation of the neural correlates of implicit and explicit memory.
Nature, 392, 595-598.
Rugg, M. D., & Yonelinas, A. P. (2003). Human recognition memory: A cognitive
neuroscience perspective. Trends in Cognitive Neuroscience, 7, 313-319.
Slotnick, S. D., & Dodson, C. S. (2005). Support for a continuous (single-process) model
of recognition memory and source memory. Memory & Cognition, 33, 151-170.
Starns, J. J., & Hicks, J. L. (2005). Source dimensions are retrieved independently in
multidimensional monitoring tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31, 1213-1220.
Strack, F. & Förster, J. (1995). Reporting recollective experiences: Direct access to
memory systems? Psychological Science, 6, 352-358.
Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of episodic memory. London: Oxford University Press.
34

Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychologist, 26, 1-22.
Wixted, J. T., & Stretch, V. (2004). In defense of the signal detection interpretation of
remember/know judgments. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11, 616-641.
Wixted, J. T. (2007). Dual-process theory and signal-detection theory of recognition
memory. Psychological Review, 114, 152-176.
Yonelinas, A. P., Kroll, N. E. A., Dobbins, I., Lazzara, M., & Knight, R. T. (1998).
Recollection and familiarity deficits in amnesia: Convergence of remember-know,
process dissociation, and receiver operating characteristic data. Neuropsychology,
12, 323-339.
Yonelinas, A. P. (1999). The contribution of recollection and familiarity to recognition
and source-memory judgments: A formal dual-process model and an analysis of
receiver operating characteristics. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 25, 1415-1434.
Yonelinas, A. P. (2002). The nature of recollection and familiarity: A review of 30 years
of research. Journal of Memory and Language, 46, 441-517.
Yonelinas, A. P., Kroll, N. E. A., Quamme, J. R., Lazzara, M. M., Suavé, M. J.,
Widaman, K. F., & Knight, R. T. (2002). Effects of extensive temporal lobe
damage or mild hypoxia on recollection and familiarity. Nature Neuroscience, 5,
1236-1241.

35

VITA
Benjamin A. Martin received his Bachelor of Science in psychology from the
University of Georgia in 2004. During the last two years of completing that degree, he
worked as a research assistant in Richard L. Marsh’s memory laboratory at the University
of Georgia. Benjamin is currently a graduate student under the direction of Jason L.
Hicks in the Department of Psychology at Louisiana State University. He studies human
memory processes, with an emphasis in long-term memory, source memory, and
prospective memory.

36

